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AUTONOMY AND MENTAL DISORDER. EDITED BY LUBOMIRA RADOILSKA. 
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. 2012. 
 
There is a good philosophy story involving Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl Popper 
– two titans of British philosophy both from Vienna. Popper went up to 
Cambridge from London to challenge Wittgenstein’s teaching that there are no 
philosophical problems only puzzles. As the discussion started Wittgenstein 
picked up a poker and, waving it at Popper, demanded he give an example of a 
philosophical problem. Popper referred to an ethical problem. Wittgenstein left 
the room. It was a brief encounter, much discussed, that left many people in two 
minds. 
 
How autonomy and mental disorder relate is a good example of a question likely 
to provoke two minds: is it a puzzle that, as Wittgenstein would have said, is like 
a fly buzzing in a bottle which the philosopher should show out? Or is it a 
problem that takes us to frontiers of our knowledge where we should be coming 
up with good new ideas (as Popper would have argued). This collection of 
philosophical essays is in two minds but overall edges towards recognizing a 
need for new ideas about the relation between autonomy and mental disorder. 
The question is certainly one of our big issues in psychiatry. It is a major problem 
for mental health law. 
 
Autonomy has been the big theme in moral and political philosophy since at least 
the Enlightenment and it is a substantial source of our identities. Ask why 
freedom of choice and self-determination are good in any liberal democracy and 
you are likely to elicit puzzlement: they just are. Cambridge philosopher Jane 
Heal in an interesting Wittgenstein-leaning essay remarks on this and points out 
that consensus lies not around any idea of what autonomy is (the Enlightenment 
didn’t give us this very clearly) but in our practice of valuing non-coercion.  
 
Yet psychiatrists legitimately want to know when, and when not, to treat mental 
disorder coercively and without an idea of autonomy that can help other ideas 
will step in. The main idea in mental health culture currently is risk. But risk 
attracts big questions. Do we distort probabilities of suicide and violence in the 
service of risk-based decision-making about treatment without consent? Does 
risk disable people with mental disorder from achieving equality before the law?  
 
Autonomy has been weakly woven in mental health culture hitherto and one 
reason has to do with how the concepts of autonomy and mental disorder have 
been mapped to each other as opposites. In classical liberal thought the value of 
freedom from interference from others is taken as a fundamental right unless 
one is a child, a person who harms others or a person with mental disorder. 
Explicitly, or implicitly, autonomy and the person with mental disorder have 
been conceptualized as mutually exclusive.  This is what  “unsound mind” 
reflects – the basis of our traditional mental health laws. Once unsound of mind, 
liberty is a fragile right. 
 
Yet it is clearly too simplistic to regard autonomy and the person with mental 
disorder as binary opposites and politically problematic when the concept of 
mental disorder is broad and flexible and autonomy is so socially valued. Liberal 
thinkers sensitive to this tend to foster either a highly skeptical attitude toward 
psychiatric power or instead focus on how mental disorder does or does not 
undermine a person’s abilities to act (what philosophers call the agency concept 
of autonomy and lawyers and psychiatrists now know as decision-making 
capacity). If we take decision-making capacity seriously then mental disorder 
and autonomy are not to be thought of as mutually exclusive and there will be 
new demands to understand their varying relationships.  
 
This is primarily a philosophical text. Many of the papers are quite technical and 
there is not much emphasis on psychiatric phenomenology or law. That said, I 
suspect BJP readers will find the papers no harder going than many other papers 
in psychiatric research and will certainly find them relevant to practice. 
 
Researchers and scholars of autonomy are starting to take an interest in mental 
disorder rather than treating it as a black box or as a thing to regard with 
extreme skepticism. That marks a significant intellectual change and this 
collection of essays, usefully structured by the editor, with a synthetic 
introduction, makes a very interesting contribution.   
 
 
GARETH S OWEN       
 
